

6 January 1974

## INFORMATION FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Draft US Position Paper on the Establishment of Observation Posts

1. This paper lays out a system of observation posts to be negotiated with the Soviet Union as a separate measure. The US would reject any linkage to the reduction of foreign forces in Germany and to demilitarization there, which the Soviets still appear to want. The proposal is to be discussed first in the EATO Council, and only subsequently at the Geneva Conference.

2. The paper contains an illustrative system of posts plus more extensive lists designed to provide a basis for flexibility in the US position. The US would seek a "concession" in EATO, but would not try to get prior EATO agreement on a specific system before there had been an opportunity to test Soviet intentions with the illustrative system. The posts for the illustrative system, for both EATO and the Soviet Bloc, are laid out in Annex A, and the more extensive lists in Annex B and C. The latter are based on a study by the Joint Chiefs (JCS-773-63), with modifications.

3. One element in the paper by the Joint Chiefs, mobility outside agreed observation post areas, has been discarded as non-negotiable. A modified form of aerial surveillance has been retained for the satellites and Western Europe only, primarily to illustrate the capabilities of such surveillance and the effect of its absence on other elements of the system. ACIA views aerial surveillance as valuable but not essential, and recommends that it not be a condition for an otherwise acceptable agreement.

4. The following is a discussion of the proposed illustrative system:

a. Border Posts - (p. 3-11; Annex A, p. 2)

There are 25 posts in this category, including 17 at rail transloading sites near Soviet-Satellite borders, three at ports, and four to monitor rail moves in the Caucasus and toward Norway. Our experts believe that these posts are well chosen for their purpose. The 17 at transloading posts can effectively monitor rail traffic between the USSR and the satellites provided that the observers have mobility in the area of the transloading

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complexes associated with each post. (Annex A, page 2) They would add the Soviet Baltic ports of Ventspils and Klaipeda to the remaining seven, to check on amphibious end runs.

b. Supplementary Posts at Transportation Centers - (p. 11-13; Annex A, p. 3) There are 35 of these posts, including 26 in the USSR. They are included on the assumption that air surveillance of the Soviet Union proper could not be negotiated. These posts are generally located further in the interior than the above border posts. Our experts do not believe that from the transportation standpoint they would provide adequate warning. Many alternate routes are available from the centers selected, and it would be impossible to determine the destination of trains leaving yards. Some 55 centers in the USSR alone would be required to do this, and they could probably give no more than 2½ hours more notice than the 17 border posts.

c. Posts for Aerial Surveillance - (p. 13-15; Annex A, p. 3) These posts would cover only five satellite countries. East Germany (and West Germany) would be omitted, to avoid the problem of negotiations with West Germany. ACDA expects that air surveillance will prove unacceptable to the USSR (and in this they are probably correct), but feels that discussion of this issue could help to justify other Western demands. Our experts agree that aerial observations would provide useful opportunities to observe movements over the transportation system and other evidence of possible hostile intent.

d. Posts at Military Air Bases (p. 15-19; Annex B p. 3) There would be 15 of these posts, all in the USSR and all but one at bomber bases. They are directed at the strategic rather than the tactical threat, since posts would be largely ineffective, or unneeded, against the latter. ACDA omits missile bases, reasoning that observation posts could not provide adequate warning of missile attack. Our experts do not believe that the proposed posts could be very effective, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between training exercises and the real thing. This aside, any bombers grounded by surveillance could be used for post attack damage assessment or

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
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follow on attack. Our experts agree that posts at missile bases could not give adequate warning of impending attack, because of short reaction times and the difficulty of distinguishing a dry run from an actual attack.

e. Observers With Troop Units (p. 19) The observers would be located with troop units in East and West Germany. Negotiations would be handled on a four power basis to avoid dealing with East Germany. Our experts believe, as does ACIA, that the effectiveness of the observers will depend on the modalities agreed to. They would favor observers at division headquarters, and believe that the most important requirement is considerable mobility, including the right to observe road and rail movements. Fixed posts along the road and rail system in East Germany could not provide adequate warning, unless there were literally hundreds of them.

5. An illustrative system of posts to be located in NATO countries is discussed at pages 25-27 and in Annex A, pages 5 to 8. This is an aid to NATO planning only, since it is expected that the Soviet Union will submit its own requirements.

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